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INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL OR PARTICULARLY WELL
SUITED? RECONSIDERING THE TREATMENT OF
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN USE VARIANCE APPLICATIONS
Megan E. Bedell

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

The placement of affordable housing in New Jersey has prompted a contentious and enduring debate. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has penned hundreds of pages in an attempt to orchestrate a
1
workable resolution. In the landmark case, Southern Burlington Coun2
ty NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), the New Jersey Supreme Court denounced the common practice of exclusionary
zoning and later reaffirmed its denunciation in Southern Burlington
3
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II). The effort on the part of the New Jersey Supreme Court to confront exclusionary zoning practices has been referred to as “among the most
4
ambitious judicial crusades” in the country. At the time of Mount
Laurel I, municipalities commonly used their zoning ordinances as a
5
tool to exclude low-income residents from their borders in an at∗
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thank you for your continuing support, patience, and for enabling me to chase after
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1
See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975); S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
2
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
3
456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
4
John Charles Boger, Lessons Learned from Mount Laurel: Mount Laurel at 21 Years:
Reflections on the Powers of Courts and Legislatures to Shape Social Change, 27 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1450, 1452 (1997).
5
See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 718–19.
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6

tempt to keep property taxes down. In the face of these practices,
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that every municipality has a
7
constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing. After eight
years of municipalities resisting Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed municipalities’ constitutional obligation to
provide affordable housing, expanded the builder’s remedy, a device
8
intended to encourage municipalities to comply with Mount Laurel I,
and invited the New Jersey State Legislature to become involved in
9
the fight to end exclusionary zoning practices. The New Jersey Legislature passed the Fair Housing Act of 1985 (FHA) in an attempt to
give life to the constitutional mandate that the Supreme Court an10
nounced in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II. The FHA created a
comprehensive system by which municipalities could participate in a
program that would assign their fair share of the housing shortfall
and in return provide participating municipalities protection from
11
builder’s remedy lawsuits.
Prior to implementation of a comprehensive legislative scheme
to handle the deficiency of affordable housing, New Jersey’s courts
deemed affordable housing an inherently beneficial use for the purposes of obtaining a use variance under the Municipal Land Use Law
12
(MLUL). The effect of decreeing affordable housing an inherently
beneficial use was to relax certain requirements in the use variance
6

Id. at 723.
See id. at 724.
8
A builder’s remedy is a device intended to encourage municipalities to comply
with Mount Laurel I that allows a developer who has successfully challenged a municipality’s exclusionary zoning ordinances to construct its development where it proposed to do so, unless the municipality can come forward with environmental or
other substantial planning concerns. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 456 A.2d at 452.
9
See id. at 415.
10
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-302–03 (West 2008).
11
See discussion of a builder’s remedy infra Part II.C. The FHA created the
Council on Affordable Housing to oversee municipalities’ compliance with their
constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing. See infra Part II.C. Recently
the New Jersey legislature has sought to significantly alter the legal framework in existence regarding the development of affordable housing. See infra note 263. For the
purposes of arguments made within this Comment, it is inconsequential whether the
oversight powers remain with the Council on Affordable Housing or are vested in
another governmental agency. See infra note 263 for further discussion on recent
developments regarding bills to abolish the Council on Affordable Housing.
12
For purposes of this Comment, “use” variance will refer to any variance issued
under § 40:55D-70(d)(1) of the Municipal Land Use Law. See, e.g., Wash. Shopping
Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Wash. Land Use Bd., No. A-0444-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 427, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2008) (“A variance issued pursuant to [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70(d)(1)] is generally known in land use law as a
‘use’ variance.”); see also infra Part IV.A–B.
7
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application process, thereby making it easier for an applicant to ob13
tain reprieve from zoning restrictions.
Specifically, the supreme
court found five years prior to deciding Mount Laurel I that “furnish[ing] housing for minority or underprivileged segments of the
population outside of ghetto areas is a special reason [for the pur14
poses of granting a use variance].” More than likely, the motivation
behind granting affordable housing such coveted status was to help
15
end exclusionary zoning practices.
Assessment of whether New Jersey’s attempt to end exclusionary
zoning practices has been successful is mixed. While the efforts expended under the FHA appear to have helped create more affordable housing, the housing that has been built appears to be priced at a
rate affordable only to the wealthiest of low-income earners and has
16
not helped relocate urban minorities to New Jersey suburbs.
In
terms of actual numbers, the Council on Affordable Housing states
that it has given certification for 70,000 units, 36,000 of which have
17
been built. Despite compliance by many municipalities with the
FHA, a recent appellate division case has added fuel to the affordable
housing fire.
In August 2009, the appellate division announced its decision in
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Township Land Use Planning Board
18
(Homes of Hope). Homes of Hope involved a novel issue that touched
upon the interplay between the statutory scheme created for handling affordable housing, the FHA, and the statutory scheme which
governs a municipality’s ability to zone and grant variances, the
19
MLUL. The appellate division decided that a zoning board should
13

See Wash. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427, at *7; see infra
Part V.B.
14
DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Hous. Corp. No. 1, 267 A.2d 31, 38 (N.J.
1970).
15
See DeSimone, 267 A.2d at 34.
Englewood, like many others, is a city of striking contrasts. It is five
square miles in area . . . . The population of about 28,000 is 20% to
25% Black. . . . [I]ts white population is generally affluent . . . . By far
the greater part of the black population lives in the Fourth Ward . . .
and a very high percentage of the housing there is substandard, much
of it not capable of rehabilitation.
See id.
16
Boger, supra note 4, at 1454–55 (1997).
17
Reports & Quick Facts, N.J. DEPT. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE
HOUSING, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/reports/ (last visited Jan. 7,
2010) (on file with author).
18
976 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
19
See infra Part IV.B.
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consider an application for a use variance to build affordable housing
in light of the preferential standard known as the inherently beneficial use doctrine, even though the municipality has satisfied its consti20
tutional affordable housing obligation per the FHA. The decision
inspired an array of criticism ranging from allegations that the case
overruled relevant precedent to predictions that the case would lead
21
to an onslaught of litigation. Most, if not all, of the criticism was exaggerated and failed to mention the principled reasons for objecting
22
to the appellate division’s decision in Homes of Hope.
The inherently beneficial use doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that recognizes some uses as so necessary to the general welfare
that municipalities should view a use variance application for those
23
uses favorably. As such, the inherently beneficial use doctrine allows
for departure from the requirement that a use variance applicant
show that the target piece of property is particularly well-suited for
24
the desired use. But where a municipality has planned for and constructed affordable housing in full satisfaction of its constitutional obligation per the FHA, a demonstrated need no longer exists within
that municipality for affordable housing as evidenced by that municipality’s certification under the FHA. Therefore, allowing affordable
housing to remain as an inherently beneficial use in a municipality
that has fully satisfied its FHA obligation is counterintuitive because
there is no demonstrable need to warrant relaxing considerations of
site suitability for the proposed use. As a result, the appellate divi-

20
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d
1128, 1130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009). On October 8, 2010 the appellate division invalidated significant portions of the revised third round rules promulgated by
the Council of Affordable Housing. See In re N.J.A.C 5:96 and 5:97, No. A-5382-07T3,
2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct 8. 2010). The court found
the growth-share methodology allows a municipality to shirk its affordable housing
requirements by passing land use ordinances that retard development. Id. at *20.
The court advised “COAH to adopt third round rules that incorporate a methodology similar to the methodology set forth in the first and second rules, which were approved by courts in most respects.” Id. at 29. The court noted that it had doubts as
to whether any growth share methodology would be valid under the Mount Laurel
doctrine because the supreme court, in Mount Laurel II, indicated a disapproval of
any methodology “that was substantially dependent upon individual municipalities’
decisions as to whether to grow.” Id. at 29. It is unclear from the opinion whether
the substantive certification granted to municipalities, such as Eastampton, remains
valid or not. The court charged COAH with creating new rules within five months.
Id. at 78.
21
See infra Part IV.C.
22
See infra Part IV.D.
23
WILLIAM COX, NEW JERSEY ZONING AND LAND USE ADMINISTRATION 187 (2010).
24
See infra Part III.B.
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sion’s decision in Homes of Hope unnecessarily duplicates and undermines the FHA process and it also ignores the limited role use variances should have in the development of municipalities.
The inherently beneficial use doctrine should be reserved for
25
uses for which a municipality and its surrounding areas have a need.
As such, if a municipality has satisfied its FHA obligation, a use variance to build affordable housing should be reviewed under the
non-inherently beneficial use standard, which requires the piece of
property for which the variance is requested to be particularly well26
suited for the use. This is the appropriate course of action because
a well-recognized preference exists within the state of New Jersey for
27
land-use planning via zoning. And because of this preference, the
grant of a use variance will always be considered the exception, rather
28
than the rule. Therefore, each decision to grant or deny a use va29
riance should be reviewed on its own facts. Furthermore, zoning
boards are recognized as particularly well-equipped to determine the
efficacy of denying a variance, and therefore, decisions by zoning
boards are reviewed in a deferential manner by the judiciary when
30
they are challenged. These reasons necessitate the conclusion that a
municipality that has actually achieved its allotment of affordable
housing, as determined under the FHA, should be entitled to review
an application for a use variance to build affordable housing under
the non-inherently beneficial use analysis which requires the use be
31
particularly well-suited for the piece of land in question.
To provide context for the debate in New Jersey over affordable
housing, in Part II, this Comment will set out the framework in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court established a municipality’s constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing and the subsequent
codification of that obligation by the New Jersey State Legislature in
the FHA. In Part III, this Comment will discuss the process by which
a use variance is granted and provide examples of uses that are and
are not considered inherently beneficial and the judiciary’s reasoning
behind declaring certain uses inherently beneficial. Part IV will dis-

25

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.B (discussing what an applicant must show to obtain a use variance).
27
See COX, supra note 23, at 182.
28
Id.
29
Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1990).
30
See infra Part III.A.
31
See infra Part III.B (discussing what an applicant must show to obtain a use variance).
26
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cuss the development of the inherently beneficial use doctrine by the
judiciary, the application of the inherently beneficial use standard to
affordable housing, the Homes of Hope decision, and whether the outcry over the Homes of Hope decision is warranted. Finally, Part V will
discuss why the Homes of Hope decision effectively allows the exception, a use variance, to swallow the rule, the preference for zoning,
and why an application for affordable housing in a municipality that
has achieved its fair share of affordable housing should be reviewed
under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis.
II. A MUNICIPALITY’S FAIR SHARE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING:
A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND CRITICISMS
A. Mount Laurel I
In 1975 the New Jersey Supreme Court confronted exclusionary
32
zoning practices head on in Mount Laurel I. The plaintiffs in Mount
Laurel I were a group of minorities, Hispanics and blacks, who were
33
seeking affordable housing in Mount Laurel. Mount Laurel, like
many other municipalities, engaged in exclusionary land use zon34
ing. For instance, Mount Laurel’s zoning ordinance retained 29.2%
35
of land within the municipality for industry. But the court noted,
“as happens in the case of so many municipalities, much more land
[had] been so zoned than the reasonable potential for industrial
36
movement or expansion warrant[ed].” Because the land was zoned
37
for industry, residential dwellings were prohibited in that zone. The
zoning ordinance designated 10,000 acres for residential develop38
ment and divided this land into four zones. Each zone only permitted single-family detached dwellings, which allowed for substantial
39
development but at a low density. The court found that the “ordinance requirements, while not as restrictive as those in many similar
municipalities, nonetheless realistically allow only homes within the
40
financial reach of persons of at least middle income.” Mount Laurel
effectively zoned out low- and moderate-income citizens by creating
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
Id. at 717.
See id. at 719.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 719.
Id.
Id.
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large lot-size requirements, age restrictions, and limits or prohibitions
41
on the number of children that could live within a particular zone.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the tax structure
42
of New Jersey motivated municipalities to use exclusionary zoning.
Specifically, the court found the objective of such zoning practices
43
was to keep property taxes down because the cost of funding municipal county governments, and primary and secondary education is
44
derived from taxes on local real estate. The fewer children in a municipality’s schools, the lower the overall cost to run the schools,
45
which would result in lower taxes in the community. Municipalities
require large lot sizes to generate greater tax revenue to meet the
46
cost of educating the school-age children in the community and
adopt restrictions on the amount of bedrooms or completely ban
multi-family dwellings to help reduce the actual number of children
47
in the municipality. By doing so, municipalities disfavor low- and
moderate-income families who cannot purchase mega-mansions that
48
help fund the increased education costs. In light of the prevalent
use of exclusionary zoning, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
“every [developing] municipality must . . . presumptively make realis49
tically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing.” The
court found that a municipality could not foreclose the opportunity
of affordable housing within its boundaries and that a municipality
must provide for its “fair share of the present and prospective region50
al need” for such housing.
B. Mount Laurel II and a Plea for Legislative Intervention
Eight years later, in the face of continued exclusionary land use
51
practices, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Mount Laurel II.
The court found that Mount Laurel persisted in its use of “a blatantly
52
exclusionary [zoning] ordinance.” The court affirmed its commit41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 721–22.
Id. at 723.
Id.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d. at 724.
Id.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
Id. at 410.
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ment to the constitutional obligation of municipalities to provide an
opportunity for affordable housing that it previously announced in
53
Mount Laurel I. It sought to clarify, to strengthen, and to make easier public officials’ and municipalities’ abilities to conform to the con54
stitutional obligation. The court explained that the constitutional
power to zone must be exercised for the general welfare and that the
general welfare, in terms of housing, was not limited to just the municipality’s needs but the general welfare of the surrounding region
55
that creates a housing demand within a particular municipality. The
court declared that when a developer successfully challenged exclusionary zoning ordinances and proposed a housing project that contained a certain percentage of affordable housing, a builder’s remedy
56
should exist. A builder’s remedy essentially allows the developer’s
project to be built in the proposed spot unless the municipality can
come forth with evidence of environmental or other substantial
57
planning concerns. In Mount Laurel II, the Supreme Court noted its
preference for legislative action on the matter of affordable housing,
but it also noted that it would continue to uphold the constitutional
58
obligation established in Mount Laurel I.
C. The Legislature Responds: The Nuts and Bolts of the FHA
Ten years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Mount
Laurel I, the New Jersey State Legislature adopted the Fair Housing
59
Act. The stated intention of the FHA is to implement a framework
that allows for enforcement of a municipality’s constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing as stated in Mount Laurel I and af60
firmed in Mount Laurel II. Specifically, the legislature explained that
“this act is in the public interest in that it comprehends a low and
moderate income housing planning and financing mechanism in accordance with regional considerations and sound planning concepts
which satisfies the constitutional obligation enunciated by the New
61
Jersey Supreme Court.” The FHA established the Council on Affordable Housing (Council or COAH), which has primary jurisdic53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 415.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 452.
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 456 A.2d at 452.
Id. at 417.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West 2001).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-303 (West 2009).
Id.
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tion over the administration of housing obligations. The Council is
charged with determining housing regions, estimating the regional
need for low- and moderate- income housing, and adopting criteria
for determining each municipality’s current and prospective share of
63
that need based on a ten year period. Participation in the statutory
scheme implemented by the legislature to tackle the affordable hous64
ing problem within the state is not mandatory. If a municipality
chooses to participate, it does so by adopting a resolution of participation and informing the Council of its intent to submit a housing
65
plan. No punishment is imposed for failure to participate, but a
municipality that chooses not to participate does not get the benefit
of exhausting administrative remedies provided by the statute prior
66
to litigation. Recently, the Council announced its highest level of
67
68
participation in the Third Round with 303 of the 566 municipalities in New Jersey signaling their intent to participate.
Under the FHA, a participating municipality must create a housing element that will meet its current and prospective need for af69
fordable housing. The housing element should include an inventory of existing housing stock that details the number of affordable
housing units available, the rental value, a projection of future affordable housing construction, analysis of the municipality’s demographic characteristics, and its existing and probable future employ70
ment opportunities. The FHA provides a non-exhaustive list as to
how a municipality can comply with its affordable-housing require71
ments. The suggestions include a redetermination of how much
land is needed for residential housing, a determination of how to
62

Id. § 52:27D-304(a).
Id. § 52:27D-307.
64
See id. § 52:27D-309(a) (stating that “each municipality which so elects shall, by
duly adopted resolution of participation, notify the council of its intent to submit to
the council its fair share housing plan” (emphasis added)); see also COAH Fact Sheet,
N.J. DEPT. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING,
http://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/reports/factsheet.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2009) (stating “[t]he Act [FHA] also stipulated that . . . COAH is a voluntary
process”) [hereinafter COAH Fact Sheet].
65
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-309(a).
66
See § 52:27D-309(b).
67
Press Release, Council on Affordable Housing, Council on Affordable Housing
Announces Record Participation (Jan. 7, 2009).
68
Fast Facts, STATE OF N.J., http://www.state.nj.us/nj/about/facts/facts (last visited March 29, 2009).
69
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-310; see supra note 11.
70
Id.
71
Id. § 52:27D-311.
63
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keep housing units affordable to low- and moderate-income resi72
dents, and plans for infrastructure expansion if required. A municipality then submits its newly created housing element to the Coun73
cil and petitions the Council for substantive certification. If the
public makes no objections to a municipality’s housing element within forty-five days after the date of notice to the public, the Council
will review the housing element and grant substantive certification
74
providing certain criteria are met.
Upon receiving substantive certification and construction of the
affordable-housing units the municipality is obligated to build, a municipality may alter its zoning ordinances without approval of the
75
Council. Thus, a municipality may rezone property zoned for affordable housing if it has received substantive certification and built
76
the required housing to fulfill its obligation. This is significant because the law designed to handle construction of affordable housing,
the FHA, allows a municipality to eliminate planned surplus, but affordable housing remains an inherently beneficial use for the purposes of obtaining a use variance. This makes the use variance procedure, which is regarded as an exception to the preference for
zoning, more protective than the FHA when it comes to surplus affordable housing. In order to achieve efficient land uses and to harmonize the FHA with the MLUL, the prospect of excess affordable
housing should be treated the same under both statutes. Doing this
77
is particularly salient given the intended rarity of variances. Treating affordable housing as a non-inherently beneficial use would allow
affordable housing to be treated similarly under both the FHA and
72

§ 52:27D-311(a)(2),(3),(4).
Id. § 52:27D-313.
74
Substantive certification will be granted provided the Council finds:
[a] The municipality’s fair share plan is consistent with the rules and
criteria adopted by the council and not inconsistent with achievement
of the low and moderate income housing needs of the region . . . [b]
The combination of the elimination of unnecessary housing costgenerating features from the municipal land use ordinances and regulations, and the affirmative measures in the housing element and implementation plan make the achievement of the municipality’s fair
share of low and moderate income housing realistically possible . . . .
Id. § 52:27D-314.
75
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311(g).
76
See id.; see also V & L Assocs. v. Twp. of Montville, No. A-2121-04T5, 2006 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1343, at *41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jun. 2, 2006) (interpreting § 52-27D-311(g) and stating that “[t]he only benefit conferred by the statute [§
52:27D-311(g)] is to allow a municipality to rezone property that had been designated for affordable housing but later determined to be surplus to its obligations”).
77
See infra Part III.A.
73

BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

COMMENT

2/9/2011 7:45 AM

329

the MLUL; yet, a non-inherently beneficial use analysis would still allow for construction of additional affordable housing after taking into account the pertinent criteria.
Notably, the FHA effectively eliminated the builder’s remedy for
78
municipalities that receive substantive certification. But municipalities that choose not to participate in the Council’s certification
process are susceptible to builder’s remedy lawsuits and “lose their
ability to choose where and how affordable housing will be pro79
vided.” In Homes of Hope, the Eastampton Land Use Planning Board
(Board) argued that declaring affordable housing an inherently
beneficial use in a municipality that has received substantive certifica80
tion from the Council would be tantamount to a builder’s remedy.
The Board reasoned that the effect was similar because it would lose
the ability to control the location of affordable housing within its
81
boundaries despite its compliance with the Council’s requirements.
Homes of Hope, Inc. disagreed; it pointed to the definition of a
82
builder’s remedy as found in the FHA. Specifically, Homes of Hope,
83
Inc. explained the relief it sought was prerogative writ relief and not
a builder’s remedy that would be a “court imposed remedy for a litigant who is an individual or a profit-making entity in which the court
requires a municipality to utilize zoning techniques . . . which provide
84
the economic viability of a residential development.”
Clearly, Homes of Hope, Inc. did not literally seek a builder’s
remedy, but the practical effect of allowing affordable housing to remain as an inherently beneficial use in Eastampton is the same as a
builder’s remedy. Eastampton did in fact lose its ability to decide
where affordable housing would go within its borders despite having
planned accordingly for its fair share of the housing shortfall, having
received substantive certification of its plan and effecting construc85
tion of its fair share creating a surplus of at least twenty-one units.
78

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-328.
COAH Fact Sheet, supra note 64.
80
Brief of Defendant/Appellant Eastampton Township Land Use Planning
Board at 14–15, Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd.,
976 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 9, 2008) (No. A-5551-07T2) [hereinafter Brief of Eastampton].
81
See id. at 11.
82
Brief of Plaintiff/Respondent Homes of Hope, Inc. at 16, Homes of Hope, Inc.
v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Oct. 2, 2008) (No. A-5551-07T2) [hereinafter Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc.].
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at 10.
79
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This is an important point because in a FHA compliant municipality,
a use variance for affordable housing will effectively be a builder’s
remedy despite the legislature’s attempt to do away with builders’
remedies in the FHA. Per the decision in Homes of Hope, an application for a use variance to build affordable housing will be analyzed
under the inherently beneficial use status, which does not take into
86
account site suitability. Effectively, a municipality loses control over
where affordable housing goes, just as it does via a builder’s remedy,
despite its compliance with the FHA and despite a lack of need for
affordable housing as evidenced by its compliance with the FHA. If
an application to build affordable housing is reviewed under the noninherently beneficial use standard, a municipality would retain more
control over where affordable housing is built within its borders.
D. The Successes and Failures of the FHA
The FHA has been criticized as a deviation from what the New
Jersey Supreme Court intended in Mount Laurel I and II. While the
objective behind implementing the FHA was to codify the constitutional obligation announced in Mount Laurel I and affirmed in Mount
Laurel II, some argue that the FHA weakened the obligation with un87
necessary procedure.
Others conclude that while benefits have
been associated with the FHA, those benefits have not been bestowed
88
upon racial minorities. One author found that while some affordable housing may have been produced by the FHA, “those units have
primarily gone to white home buyers, furthering the racial segrega89
tion and contradicting the spirit of Mount Laurel.”
A study conducted in 1997 indicated that black and Latino applicants had significantly less success in obtaining affordable housing
90
than their white counterparts. At the time the study was done, the
authors concluded that, in obtaining affordable housing, blacks had
only half of the success rate of whites and that Latinos had a third of

86

See infra Part III.B.
See Eamonn K. Bakewell, Foreclosure of a Dream: The Impact of the Council on Affordable Housing’s New Regulations on the Constitutional Duty to Provide Affordable Housing
in New Jersey, 2 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 310, 317–20 (2005).
88
Bernard K. Ham, Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Radical Segregation: A Reconsideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577, 609–10
(1997).
89
Id. at 610.
90
Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, Mount Laurel Housing Symposium: The
Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1303 (1997).
87

BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

COMMENT

2/9/2011 7:45 AM

331

91

the success rate of whites. The disparity could be explained based
92
on the pricing system used by the Council. The regulations that
were in effect at the time of the study only touched the very top of the
93
low-income bracket. The study found that most successful applicants under the FHA were elderly white women, but that determining
the true need of the elderly and whether it was actually met were dif94
ficult to do.
While the ultimate success of the FHA might be debatable, it is
unclear how allowing affordable housing to remain as an inherently
beneficial use in a municipality that has fully complied with its fair
share obligation will remedy the deficiencies of the FHA. The legislature’s purpose in implementing the FHA was to create a unified,
95
comprehensive approach to tackling the housing shortfall. If the
FHA is deficient it should be examined and revamped. Given the
recognized limitations on the grant of variances, they cannot be used
96
to create the amount of housing envisioned by the FHA. The most
effective way to handle the shortfall is in a comprehensive, state-wide
initiative. Allowing affordable housing to retain preferential treatment in use variance applications in municipalities that have fully
complied with the FHA undermines the purpose of a variance, leads
to inefficient land use and usurps zoning boards’ authority to control
97
the use of land.

91

Id.
Id. at 1304.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1305.
95
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302(c) (West 2008) (“The interest of all citizens . . .
would be best served by a comprehensive planning and implementation response to
[the] constitutional obligation [announced in Mount Laurel I and II].”).
96
See Twp. of Dover v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover, 386 A.2d 421, 427 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1978) (discussing factors to consider in determining whether a Board
of Adjustment has exceeded its authority in granting a variance for a project).
97
In fact at trial, Homes of Hope, Inc. argued that the difficulty of obtaining a
variance for a use not deemed inherently beneficial was very difficult.
It’s almost like equal protection where if you have – if you fall into the
category of a suspect class, you have a chance, and if you don’t, you
don’t have much of a chance, and that’s how it is with inherently beneficial. If you get into that inherently beneficial category, you have a
fighting chance on a downhill road, and if you are not, my experience
is you have almost no chance.
See Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at app. DA13. This argument, however, does
not acknowledge the fact that variances are not intended to be easy to obtain. See
infra Part III.A.
92
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III. VARIANCE PRACTICES
A. Plan for the Future
The benefits from zoning are numerous. Zoning leads to effi98
cient uses of resources and planning. Municipal governments may
wish to reduce the potential for car accidents by creating residential
99
districts that tend to have less traffic than commercial districts. Predictable development is necessary to allocate funds to the develop100
ment of roads and manageable traffic patterns.
Zoning allows a
municipality to plan its water systems based on a projected need, and
101
it helps to contain noxious fumes from industrial uses.
In New Jersey, a municipality’s right to implement zoning rules
that control the use of land within its boundaries is based on the police powers found in the New Jersey State Constitution and has been
102
codified by the New Jersey State Legislature.
The importance of
planning for development through zoning is evidenced by the stated
103
intentions of the MLUL. One of the stated objectives of the MLUL
is to control development in order to promote appropriate densities
that will contribute to the well-being of the communities, neighbor104
hoods, and environment.
A municipality’s zoning ordinances are
105
presumptively reasonable.
To reflect the policy of comprehensive
zoning, which underlies the MLUL, variances should be granted spa106
ringly and under exceptional circumstances. In fact, William Cox, a
foremost authority on New Jersey land use and zoning, writes, “Because there is a strong legislative policy favoring land use planning by

98
See Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 392–94 (1926) (stating various benefits associated with zoning); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2(a)–(o) (West
1991) (listing various purposes for zoning).
99
See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392–94.
100
See id.
101
See id.
102
See generally Fischer v. Twp. of Bedminster, 93 A.2d 378, 381–83 (N.J. 1952).
103
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2(e) (West 2009).
104
Id.
105
Ne. Towers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Patterson, 744 A.2d 190, 195
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
106
Id.; Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 778
A.2d 482, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001); see also Pierce Estates Corp., v.
Bridgewater Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 697 A.2d. 195, 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997) (“[B]ecause use variances tend to impair sound zoning, they should be
granted sparingly and with great caution. . . . Consequently, ‘an applicant bears a
heavy burden in overcoming a denial.’” (internal citations omitted)).

BEDELL_FINAL_FORMATTED_1.25.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

COMMENT

2/9/2011 7:45 AM

333

ordinance rather than by variance, the grant of a [use] variance will
107
always be the exception rather than the rule.”
New Jersey’s preference for planning through zoning is also seen
in the standard of judicial review afforded to a grant or denial of a
use variance. Because zoning boards have a peculiar knowledge of
local conditions, their decisions on whether to grant a variance are
108
viewed deferentially. Notably, “[e]ven when doubt is entertained as
to the wisdom of the action, or as to some part of it, there can be no
judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of dis109
cretion by the public agencies involved.”
When under judicial review, the presumption in favor of planning via zoning manifests itself
in the form of greater deference to a zoning board’s decision to deny
110
a variance than to a grant of a variance.
Specifically, judicial review of a zoning board’s decision is limited; “[a] board’s decision is presumptively valid, and is reversible
only if arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. . . . In sum, courts will
defer to a decision if it is supported by the record and is not so arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discre111
tion.” Furthermore, each case that involves a grant or a denial of a
112
use variance should be reviewed on its own facts, which is significant because many cases that involve an assessment of affordable
housing as an inherently beneficial use, including Homes of Hope, appear to simply declare the project an inherently beneficial use be113
cause it has been one in the past.
Courts are inconsistent: some
courts reference in their analysis a need for an inherently beneficial
use, and others only refer to precedent in declaring a use inherently
114
beneficial. Clearly, despite this inconsistency, “determining wheth-

107

COX, supra note 23, at 182; see also Pierce Estates Corp., 697 A.2d at 199.
Ne. Towers, 744 A.2d at 199; see also Wash. Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Wash.
Land Use Bd., No. A-0444-07T2, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 427, at *10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2008) (stating that “[b]oard decisions are presumed valid and the party attacking them has the burden of proving otherwise” (internal citations omitted)).
109
Ne. Towers, 744 A.2d at 199 (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment of Sea Girt,
45 N.J. 268, 296 (N.J. 1965)).
110
Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (explaining that “[c]ourts give greater deference to variance denials than to grants of variances, since variances tend to impair sound zoning”).
111
Smart SMR v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d 1271, 1280
(N.J. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
112
See Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1990).
113
See infra Part III.C.
114
See infra Part III.C.
108
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er a use is inherently beneficial is a fact-sensitive inquiry, even where
115
the use involves health care or hospital facilities.”
Because evaluation of a use variance is a fact-intensive inquiry, a
use variance application to build affordable housing should include
an assessment of a municipality’s need. The nature of a fact-intensive
inquiry would seemingly lead to the conclusion that a particular set of
facts in one municipality that give rise to an inherently beneficial
standard for a use variance would not necessarily do so in another.
Yet affordable housing remains an inherently beneficial use despite
the fact that the conditions in one municipality might not warrant
such preferential status. This is clearly the exception swallowing the
116
rule. Variances are intended to be used sparingly, yet there currently seems to be a per se rule that no matter the factual scenario,
affordable housing will remain an inherently beneficial use.
B. Procedure for Obtaining a Variance: Inherently and Non-Inherently
Beneficial Use Standards
The MLUL governs the ability of a zoning board to grant a variance. Under the MLUL a variance may be granted for special reasons to allow a departure from the planned use of the area to permit
“[a] use or principal structure in a district restricted against such use
117
or principal structure.”
The MLUL does not provide a definition
for what constitutes a special reason to grant a variance. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has determined that a special reason for
granting a variance exists if the reason falls within the purposes of
118
zoning as specified by the MLUL in section 40:55D-2. One purpose
of zoning set forth in section 40:55D-2 of the MLUL, upon which applicants most commonly rely as a special reason for granting a use va119
riance, is that the proposed use promotes the general welfare.
To obtain a use variance, an applicant must satisfy both positive
120
and negative criteria. The positive criteria are satisfied by showing a
121
special reason as listed in section 40:55D-2 of the MLUL. If the use
is non-inherently beneficial and the asserted special reason is the
promotion of the general welfare, which in most cases it is, the appli115

Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 501.
Id. at 495; see also supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
117
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70(d)(1) (West 2009).
118
Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1990).
119
Id.
120
Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d
1271, 1278 (N.J. 1997).
121
See Burbridge, 568 A.2d at 532–33.
116
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cant must also show the proposed use is particularly well-suited for
the target parcel of land because “nearly all lawful uses of property
promote . . . the general welfare. Thus, if the general social benefits
of any individual use—without reference to its particular location—
were to be regarded as an adequate special reason, a special reason
122
almost always would exist for a use variance.” A proposed use that is
determined to be an inherently beneficial use, however, will presumptively satisfy the positive criteria without any requirement that
123
the use be particularly well-suited for the target property.
To satisfy the negative criteria for a non-inherently beneficial
use, the applicant must show both that the variance can be granted
without substantial detriment to the public good and that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the
124
master plan and zoning ordinance. The applicant must meet what
125
is referred to as an enhanced quality of proof.
Specifically, “clear
and specific findings” must demonstrate “that the variance sought is
not inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the master plan and
126
zoning ordinance.”
The proofs and findings must “reconcile the
proposed use variance with the zoning ordinance’s omission of the
127
use from those permitted in the zoning district.”
The first prong of the negative criteria focuses on the variance’s
128
Under the first
effect on the surrounding area and buildings.
prong the relevant question is whether allowing the variance will
cause damage to the character of the neighborhood, resulting in sub129
stantial detriment to the public good.
The second prong asks
whether the proposed use will undermine the intent of the zoning
130
Cox explains this prong focuses on “the extent to which a
plan.
grant of the variance would constitute an arrogation of governing
131
body and planning board authority.”
The New Jersey Supreme
122

Kohl v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 234 A.2d 385, 391 (N.J. 1967).
Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 603 A.2d 30, 34 (N.J. 1992).
124
Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc., 704 A.2d at 1278.
125
Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 119 (N.J. 1987).
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 566 A.2d
575, 579 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (quoting Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109,
121 n.12 (N.J. 1987)).
129
Id.
130
See id.
131
COX, supra note 23, at 252 (explaining that this requirement helps make it
clear that “municipalities should make zoning decisions by ordinance rather than by
variance”).
123
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Court instructed that, with regard to the negative criteria, “[t]he
board’s resolution should contain sufficient findings, based on the
proofs submitted, to satisfy a reviewing court that the board has analyzed the master plan and zoning ordinance, and determined that the
governing body’s prohibition of the proposed use is not incompatible
132
with a grant of the variance.” If a proposed use is deemed to be inherently beneficial, the applicant does not need to meet the higher
quality of proof to satisfy the negative criteria, but a balancing test
133
still applies.
When a zoning board is confronted with an application for a use variance to construct an inherently beneficial use, the
supreme court suggests a zoning board should first identify the public
interest at stake, acknowledging that some uses are more beneficial
134
than others.
Second, a board should identify the detrimental ef135
fect, if any, of granting the variance.
Third, a board can alleviate
the detrimental effects by imposing reasonable conditions on the
136
grant of the variance. Fourth, the board should weigh the positive
and the negative criteria to determine whether the former outweighs
137
the latter. Only once both the positive and negative criteria are met
138
should a zoning board approve a use variance.
C. The Inherently Beneficial Use Doctrine Explained
The inherently beneficial use doctrine is a judicially created doc139
trine.
Because no definition exists for what qualifies as a special
reason in the MLUL, the courts were left to determine what type of
140
use would qualify as a special reason for a use variance. The courts
created the doctrine to handle a narrow spectrum of uses that were
deemed so beneficial to the community that municipalities should
use a favorable approach when considering applications for such
141
uses. Because of the perceived benefits of these uses, municipalities
were encouraged to take into account not only their need but also
132

Medici v. Madison Property Co. No. 4, 526 A.2d 109, 121 (N.J. 1987).
Med. Ctr. at Princeton v. Twp. of Princeton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 778
A.2d 482, 496 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
134
Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 603 A.2d 30, 37 (N.J. 1992); Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496.
135
Sica, 603 A.2d at 37; Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496.
136
Sica, 603 A.2d at 37; Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496.
137
Sica, 603 A.2d at 37; Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 496–97.
138
See Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704
A.2d 1271, 1278 (N.J. 1998).
139
COX, supra note 23, at 187.
140
See Kohl v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 234 A.2d 385, 389 (N.J. 1967).
141
COX, supra note 23, at 187.
133
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142

the regional need.
To determine if something is an inherently
beneficial use is a fact-intensive inquiry, even when it comes to such
143
proposed uses as hospitals or schools.
One criticism of the inherently beneficial use doctrine is that it
does not consider site suitability as is required for non-inherently
beneficial uses. An article appearing in the New Jersey Planner advocated a reconsideration of which criterion are relaxed for inherently
144
beneficial uses. The author wrote that “‘[s]ite suitability’ should be
at or near the top of zoning objectives; yet suitability receives no con145
sideration if the use is ‘inherently’ beneficial.” The article goes on
to argue that “[s]ite suitability should be shown for all variant uses.
Why shouldn’t there be substantive special reasons for all variant uses
instead of a compulsory and automatic process that ignores the es146
sence of zoning, i.e. the appropriate use of land.”
This argument is particularly salient in Homes of Hope. Eastampton complied with its FHA requirements, submitted a housing plan,
received substantive certification, and has actually constructed a sur147
plus of units. Despite all of this, a builder was able to request a variance and have it reviewed under a preferential standard without any
148
This
consideration to the suitability of the land for the purpose.
precedent threatens sound zoning principles. It will allow for uses
that have a higher density than the use for which the zone is designed, which potentially will lead to increased demand on systems
and increased traffic. It gives the builder the upper hand in determining where to put affordable housing without reference to the policy behind zoning. Therefore, an application for a use variance to
build affordable housing in a fully FHA-compliant municipality
should be reviewed in light of the suitability of the land for the use as
provided by the non-inherently beneficial use analysis. This will allow
for adequate planning for the needs of particular zones and promotes efficient use of land.

142
143
144

Id.
Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 778 A.2d at 501.
Donald M. Ross, ‘Inherently Beneficial’ Re-Thought, N.J. PLANNER, Spring 1998 at

U-4.
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id.
Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at 14.
See supra Part III.A.
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D. The Inherently Beneficial Use Doctrine in Action
Applicants for variances have relied on the inherently beneficial
use doctrine in an attempt to establish the positive criteria for a multitude of uses. Generally, courts reference some form of need when
discussing the applicability of the doctrine to the proposed use. In
overturning a grant of a variance for an expansion of a nonconforming use, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on the fact that no
need for the expansion had been shown. In Kohl v. Borough of Fair
Lawn, a dairy requested a variance to substantially increase its non149
conforming use. The special reason advanced for the grant of the
variance was that the processing and distribution of milk served the
150
general welfare.
Turning to a non-inherently beneficial use analysis, the court noted that while processing milk did serve the general
welfare, that reason alone did not provide a basis for the grant of a
151
variance. The court found no showing that an expansion of the use
on that particular piece of land was necessary for the promotion of
152
the general welfare.
The court further noted that even if the
present location was necessary to the welfare of the area, no evidence
indicated that the municipality had any need for the additional milk
153
Despite the fact
supply that would be created by the expansion.
that the court referenced a need while engaging in a non-inherently
beneficial analysis; the discussion is noteworthy because it illustrates a
hesitancy to subvert the established zones by issuing a variance for a
use for which there is no need.
Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to find
that a cell phone tower constitutes an inherently beneficial use.
When contemplating whether a cell phone tower should be an inherently beneficial use, the court explained that “inherently beneficial
154
uses are generally limited in number within a single municipality.”
The court went on to note two applications had already been made
for a use variance to build cell phone towers in the area, and the possibility of more led to concern about a potentially large number of
communications providers who might wish to install any number of
155
towers on undesignated locations throughout the state. In another
149

234 A.2d 385, 387 (N.J. 1967).
Id. at 391.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 391–92.
154
Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704
A.2d 1271, 1281 (N.J. 1998).
155
See id. at 1282.
150
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case dealing with a variance for a cell phone tower, the appellate division found the applicant could not show that the cell phone tower
would in fact improve the particular municipality’s communications,
156
and therefore, it was not an inherently beneficial use. This decision
led William Cox to surmise that “conceivably more compelling beneficial uses such as a school or hospital could be found not to be inhe157
rently beneficial under particular circumstances.” Presumably, such
circumstances would exist where a municipality and its surrounding
areas had no need for the proposed use.
On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a
hospital for emotionally disturbed persons constituted a special rea158
son for a use variance.
The court paid particular attention to the
159
urgent need for a hospital of this kind. It found that a municipality
160
may consider a need that exists beyond its own borders. The New
Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged a similar need in Sica v. Board of
161
In that
Adjustment of Township of Wall for a head trauma center.
case, the applicant received a certificate of need from the New Jersey
162
Department of Health. The court easily deemed the head trauma
center an inherently beneficial use and cited the certificate from the
163
Department of Health as evidence of the need for such a center.
In another case, however, the appellate division found that a
drug-treatment facility geared towards Jewish males did not constitute
164
an inherently beneficial use.
The court noted that extensive evidence existed substantiating a need for this kind of rehabilitation facility in the area, but no evidence existed that the Orthodox Jewish
165
community in the area had a need for such a facility.
In distinguishing this case from Sica, the court mentioned that in Sica the applicant for a use variance had a certificate of need from the Depart166
ment of Health, and in this case, the applicant did not. This case is
156
See Pierce Estates Corp. v. Bridgewater Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 697
A.2d 195, 200–01 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
157
COX, supra note 23, at 189.
158
See Kunzler v. Hoffman, 225 A.2d 321, 326 (N.J. 1966).
159
See id.
160
Id.
161
See 603 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1992).
162
Id. at 34.
163
See id.
164
See Jewish Family Serv., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Bergenfield, No. A4450-04T5, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 795, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan.
13, 2006).
165
Id. at *9.
166
Id. at *9–10.
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notable because it demonstrates that even though a general need
may exist for a particular use, the local zoning board is fully capable
and better positioned to determine whether a particular need within
the community is satisfied by the proposed inherently beneficial use.
In this case, the zoning board determined that the proposed inherently beneficial use did not fulfill a demonstrated need within the
community and therefore did not constitute an inherently beneficial
167
use.
As the cases discussed above indicate, a general need for a use
may be insufficient to qualify a proposed project as an inherently
beneficial use. But generally, courts reference some need for the
proposed use when discussing an application for a use variance. A
discussion as to the necessity of a use is appropriate and imperative in
order to foster efficient uses of land and would correctly reflect the
preference to contain and plan for particular uses through the adoption of zoning ordinances.
IV. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AS AN INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL USE
A. The Early Cases
The most frequently referenced case for the notion that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use is DeSimone v. Greater En168
glewood Housing Corp. No. 1. In DeSimone, a builder requested a variance to build 146 units of cluster-type, two-story apartments on a
ten-acre parcel of land in a portion of the city zoned for single-family
169
dwellings and inhabited predominately by whites.
The development was proposed in order to allow for relocation of residents from
another portion of the city, which was predominately black and con170
sisted of dilapidated housing. The Board of Adjustment for the City
of Englewood granted the variance and noted that the project served
the general welfare because the city suffered from a large housing
171
shortage for low-income families.
The New Jersey Supreme Court
held as follows:
[I]n the light of public policy and the law of the land, that public
or, as here, semi-public housing accommodations to provide safe,
sanitary and decent housing, to relieve and replace substandard
living conditions or to furnish housing for minority or underprivi167
168
169
170
171

See id. at *5.
267 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1970).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 37.
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leged segments of the population outside of ghetto areas is a special reason adequate to meet that requirement of [the MLUL]
172
and to ground a variance.

The facts surrounding the DeSimone case and the nature of the challenges to the variance grant caused the court to be wary of the moti173
vation behind the challenges. The court noted that a true desire to
vindicate the policy of the statutes invoked was not apparent, but ra174
ther, the court found a desire to oppose the project at all costs.
In a subsequent case, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrangled
with whether to declare private affordable housing an inherently
beneficial use such that no consideration of site suitability would be
175
required.
It decided not to answer the question and limited its
176
holding in DeSimone to public or semi-public housing projects. But
the Law Division found that private multi-family, moderate-income
177
dwellings constituted a special reason for justifying a variance. Interestingly, the court deemed it not an inherently beneficial use but
178
rather “a special reason.” Important, though, is the court’s discussion regarding the need within the municipality for affordable hous179
ing as evidenced by expert opinion.
After declaring that a special
reason existed, the court did not subsequently engage in a sitesuitability discussion so the court likely meant, and the case has been

172

Id. at 38–39.
See id. at 35.
174
DeSimone, 267 A.2d at 35.
175
Fobe Assoc. v. Mayor of Demarest, 379 A.2d 31, 39 (N.J. 1977), abrogated by S.
Burlington NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 431 n.15 (N.J. 1983).
Limiting DeSimone the court stated,
[T]he inquiry [in this case] turns to whether provision of small middleincome apartment units in Demarest is ‘inherently’ in service of the
general welfare so as to warrant a d. variance . . . .
[O]ne is hard put to respond to the insistence that if adequate
housing of all categories of people is an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation, as
stated in Mount Laurel . . . , a variance to provide additional rental
housing in a region which plainly needs it is ‘inherently’ for the general welfare . . . [w]e propose to leave definitive resolution of this . . . to a
future case . . . .
Fobe Assoc., 379 A.2d at 39–40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
176
Id. at 40–41.
177
Brunetti v. Mayor of Madison, 325 A.2d 851, 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974).
178
Id.
179
See id.
173
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construed as establishing, that private, multi-family housing is an in180
herently beneficial use.
In Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Township Zoning Board of Adjustment, the Law Division held the conversion of a single-family dwel181
ling into low-income apartments was an inherently beneficial use.
The court found that the fact that Homes of Hope, Inc. is a private
developer did not preclude its project from qualifying for the prefe182
rential treatment of the inherently beneficial use doctrine. Unlike
Brunetti, this case lacks any reference to a documented need for af183
fordable housing within the municipality. As recently as 2008, the
appellate division found that construction of affordable housing is an
inherently beneficial use for the purposes of satisfying the positive
184
criteria of a use variance. That opinion contains no discussion of a
need for affordable housing nor does it contain any discussion of
whether the particular municipality had satisfied its FHA obligation.
The court merely stated that “affordable housing has been held to be
185
an inherently beneficial use.”
These cases demonstrate the evolution of the inherently beneficial use doctrine in the affordable housing context and the largely cursory review of whether a proposed
project satisfies an established need within the municipality.
B. Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Land Use Planning
Board
Homes of Hope, Inc., a non-profit provider of affordable housing, requested a use variance from the Board to build eight multifamily affordable housing units on a lot zoned solely for single-family
186
dwellings.
The density limit in the zone was three units per acre;
187
Homes of Hope, Inc. proposed a density of 9.4 units per acre. Additionally, Homes of Hope, Inc.’s proposed use required a bulk variance from the minimum setback requirements; the zone required a
180
See Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 566
A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1989).
181
Id. at 577.
182
Id. at 577–78.
183
See id. at 577 (“The creation of housing accommodations for the underprivileged at a reduced cost makes an important contribution to the general welfare.
Homes’ plan, in operation, adds considerably to that contribution.”).
184
Wash. Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Twp. of Wash. Land Use Bd., No. A-0444-07T2,
2008 N.J. Super. LEXIS 427, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 2008).
185
Id. at *12.
186
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d
1128, 1130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
187
Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at DA53.
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forty-foot setback, but because of the configuration of the lot, Homes
188
of Hope, Inc. could only provide a twenty-foot setback.
Homes of
Hope, Inc. argued that the proposed construction of affordable hous189
ing on the lot was an inherently beneficial use.
The Board denied the use variance, bulk variance, and other re190
quests by Homes of Hope, Inc., reasoning that “surplus affordable
housing proposed by [Homes of Hope, Inc.] is not inherently beneficial, since Eastampton Township [had] already satisfied its affordable
191
housing obligation for the 3rd Round COAH cycle” and had a sur192
The Board further opined that the proplus of twenty-one units.
posed density would undermine the purpose of the zoning in direct
contravention of the MLUL and that the proposed use would not
promote “appropriate . . . aesthetics of the lot, neighborhood and
193
the . . . [z]one.”
Additionally, the Board found the proposed onstreet parking capacity was incompatible with the typical off-street
194
parking of a residential neighborhood.
Homes of Hope, Inc. appealed the Board’s decision and argued
that the Board should have to reconsider the application for the use
variance in light of the inherently beneficial status of affordable hous195
ing. The trial court agreed with Homes of Hope, Inc. that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use and instructed the Board
196
to review the application for a use variance in light of its decree.
The Board appealed the decision, and the appellate division affirmed
197
the trial court’s decision. Specifically, the appellate division found
198
that “affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use.” The court
further stated:
A municipality’s compliance with COAH regulations does not
change the necessary site-specific analysis necessary for a [use] variance. Compliance protects the municipality from litigation and
a builder’s remedy . . . but it does not impact the public policy of
this State that low and moderate income affordable housing pro188

Id. at DA32.
Id.
190
Id. at DA37.
191
Id. at DA33–34.
192
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d
1128, 1131 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
193
Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at DA33.
194
Id.
195
Id. at DA10.
196
Id. at DA24.
197
See Homes of Hope, 976 A.2d at 1134.
198
See id. at 1131.
189
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motes the general welfare and constitutes a special reason to sup199
port a “d” variance.

The concurring opinion, however, found that it was not “illogical to
conclude that once a municipality has actually provided its fair share
of affordable housing, further affordable housing projects need not
retain their status as inherently beneficial uses for the purpose of ‘d’
200
variance application.” The concurrence further stated an act of the
legislature would be required to declare that affordable housing is
not an inherently beneficial use for the purpose of obtaining a use
201
variance.
C. Emotions Run High in Wake of Homes of Hope
In the wake of the appellate division’s decision, a firestorm of
criticism erupted. Assemblyman Scott T. Rumana, a Republican
202
representing the Fortieth District of New Jersey, declared that he
203
intended to draft legislation to address the decision. He pondered
the utility of “having local land use boards if officials in Trenton or
judges in a courtroom can impose their will over the decisions made
at a local level with [the] best interests of property taxpayers in
204
mind.” State Senator Sean T. Kean, a Republican representing the
205
Eleventh District of New Jersey, proclaimed the “ruling has the potential to lead to overcrowded schools and even greater property tax
206
increases in [his district] and across the state.” He went on to say
“taxpayers have already paid millions of dollars for affordable hous207
ing plans that have now been rendered useless.”
Another article stated that the director of the New Jersey Sierra
Club found the decision outrageous because it “overturn[ed] other
case law that is more on point, including the Mount Laurel II deci-

199

Id. at 1133–34.
Id. at 1136 (Chambers, J., concurring).
201
See id.
202
Assemblyman Scott T. Rumana (R), N.J. LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us
/members/bio.asp?Leg=297 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
203
Press Release, Assemblyman Rumana Says Property Taxpayers Will Never See
Relief From Corzine’s and Court’s Housing Mandates (Aug. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.njassemblyrepublicans.com/press_release.php?id=953.
204
Id.
205
Biography, SENATOR SEAN T. KEAN, N.J.’S 11TH LEGISLATIVE DIST.,
http://seankean.senatenj.com/biography.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
206
Senator Sean T. Kean Slams COAH Court Ruling, SENATOR SEAN T. KEAN, N.J.’S
11TH LEGISLATIVE DIST. (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.senatenj.com/index.php/
seankean/sen-sean-kean-slams-coah-court-ruling/4067.
207
Id.
200
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sion” and that the Homes of Hope decision “declare[d] open season on
208
local towns and their zoning.”
The same article quoted the Independent gubernatorial candidate, Chris Daggett, as saying that “the
ruling gives town[s] no incentive to comply with COAH” and would
209
lead to “explosive litigation.”
Additionally, the League of Municipalities, a voluntary association authorized by State statute to help
municipalities govern more effectively, to which all 566 municipalities
belong, called upon the municipalities to adopt a resolution in reac210
tion to Homes of Hope.
The resolution provided by the League of
Municipalities urged the legislature to adopt a rule which would prevent any municipality from having to accept more than its fair share
211
of housing by way of variance.
D. Criticism Overlooked Principled Reasons for Disagreeing with
Homes of Hope
212

Most of the public outcry as a result of the Homes of Hope decision was exaggerated. But there are principled policy reasons that
support Eastampton’s position and that harmonize zoning ordinances, variance procedures, and the FHA. The reasons for opposing
the Homes of Hope decision that are discussed below and in Part V include the goal of efficient land use and to that end, the preference
that development in New Jersey occur through planned zoning rather than through the use of a variance which is intended to be
213
granted only for exceptional circumstances.
Further policy arguments are grounded in the notion that zoning boards are particularly
well-suited to make decisions regarding the utility of a potential use
214
within the municipality. While individual legislators have advanced
potential solutions to the legal issue presented in Homes of Hope and
the deficiencies of the FHA, any solution that is adopted should ultimately focus on the most efficient use of land and resources, rather

208

Tom Hester, Sr., N.J. Appeals Court’s Affordable Housing Ruling Sparks Outrage,
N.J. NEWSROOM (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/njappeals-courts-affordable-housing-ruling-sparks-outrage.
209
Id.
210
Sample Resolution for Legislative Action on Eastampton COAH Decision, N.J. STATE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.njslom.org/
ml091409_coah.html.
211
Id.
212
See supra Part IV.C.
213
See supra Part III.A.
214
See id.
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than create an opportunity for municipalities to escape responsibility
215
for affordable housing shortfalls.
First, the possibility that municipalities will automatically decide
not to participate in the COAH process as a result of this case is un216
likely. Municipalities have other important reasons to comply with
COAH, including the fact that the community would seek to avoid
the possibility of costly litigation challenging a municipality’s zoning
217
ordinances as exclusionary.
A former director of COAH realized
that affordable housing is a hard sell in municipalities but noted that
the litigation costs associated with fighting an exclusionary zoning
lawsuit outweighed the costs associated with creating a housing plan
218
as the COAH process dictates.
Furthermore, participation in the
COAH process affords a municipality several administrative remedies
that must be exhausted prior to litigation if its zoning laws are chal219
lenged as being exclusionary.
Fears that this case “declares open season” on municipalities’
220
zoning laws are also misplaced.
The purpose of a variance is to
grant specific relief from a zoning restriction on a specific parcel of
221
Case law establishes that a variance cannot be so vast as to
land.
cover large tracts of land:
The individuality of the variance approach is underscored by the
limitation of the board of adjustment’s power to a specific piece
of property, a limitation expressed [by the MLUL] . . . when a
large tract or a substantial area comprising several tracts is involved, the situation is beyond the intended scope of the variance
222
procedure.

If a zoning board granted a variance for such a purpose, it would be
223
beyond the scope of authority granted to the zoning board. Fears
that the Homes of Hope decision can be used as a tool by which developers can run roughshod over a municipality’s zoning ordinances are
unfounded. Zoning ordinances will not be decimated because municipalities that are inclined to participate in COAH will likely continue
215
216
217
218

See infra Part.V.
See Hester, supra note 208.
See COAH Fact Sheet, supra note 64.
Arthur Bernard, Planning for Affordable Housing, N.J. PLANNER, Spring 1996, at

U-1.
219

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316 (West 2009).
Hester, supra note 208.
221
See Dover Twp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover Twp., 386 A.2d 421, 426–27 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
222
See id. at 427 (internal quotations omitted).
223
Id. at 427.
220
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to do so to avoid litigation costs and to avail themselves of administrative remedies provided by the FHA. While this decision will not permit developers to completely circumvent zoning ordinances, as some
224
claimed, it does, however, expand the role a use variance can play
in development. Use variances are regarded as tools to be used only
225
in exceptional circumstances and with great caution, yet the Homes
of Hope decision will enable a builder to request a use variance and
have it reviewed under a preferential standard with little regard to
whether the municipality has a particular need for additional affordable housing and also without any regard to whether the land is wellsuited for the use. This effectively relaxes the extraordinary role use
variances are intended to play in development.
Second, Homes of Hope did not chisel away at the Mount Laurel
226
doctrine.
Both Mount Laurel cases addressed the prevalent use of
exclusionary zoning, which municipalities used to keep out what
227
some deemed undesirable segments of the population. Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II decreed a constitutional obligation on the
part of all municipalities to provide housing for all segments of the
228
population within their zoning ordinances. Homes of Hope, by contrast, deals with the appropriate standard to apply to a particular use
229
in an application for a variance.
The basic notion that affordable
housing provides benefits for a community and that a municipality
cannot actively refuse to include it within its borders underlies the legal issues confronted in the Mount Laurel cases and Homes of Hope.
But Mount Laurel dealt with what is constitutionally required of a mu230
nicipality in creating zoning ordinances, and Homes of Hope concerned what aspects of a proposed use must be considered in a use
231
variance application.
Contrary to the criticism that Homes of Hope overruled the Mount
Laurel cases, in deciding Homes of Hope, the appellate division did not
view either the MLUL or the FHA procedure as being intertwined at
232
In fact, the Homes of Hope decision indicated that the FHA
all.
224

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
226
Hester, supra note 208.
227
See supra Part II.A–B.
228
See id.
229
See Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Twp. Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d
1128, 1130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
230
See supra Part II.A–B.
231
See Homes of Hope, 976 A.2d at 1130.
232
Id. at 1133–34.
225
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process, which gives meaning to the constitutional obligation created
in the Mount Laurel cases, has no bearing at all on whether an application for a use variance to build affordable housing is an inherently
beneficial use. Therefore, the appellate division in deciding Homes of
Hope clearly did not think that it was making a ruling that would jeopardize either Mount Laurel I or II.
V. THE MISAPPLICATION OF INHERENTLY BENEFICIAL USE STATUS
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
233

In a fully compliant FHA municipality, affordable housing
should be reviewed under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis
234
when it requires a use variance to be built. Because a municipality,
like Eastampton, has complied with its FHA requirements and has
fulfilled its regional need of affordable housing, there is no demonstrable need that warrants the preferential treatment afforded by the
inherently beneficial use analysis. Therefore, utilizing the noninherently beneficial use analysis will lead to more efficient uses of
land by ensuring that the use is well-suited for the land on which it
will be placed. It would also harmonize the FHA and the MLUL because the FHA would remain the primary, cohesive legislation aimed
at solving the state-wide housing shortfall. Further, the noninherently beneficial use analysis would enable zoning boards to fully
utilize their particular knowledge and understanding of local conditions in order to best control development within its borders and
would honor the notion that a variance should only be used in exceptional circumstances.
A. Homes of Hope Disregards the True Nature of a Variance
The Homes of Hope decision allows the variance process to be
used to effectively circumvent zoning rules. The decision runs coun233
This Comment only suggests that the inherently beneficial use analysis not be
used in municipalities that have actually constructed their fair share of affordable
housing as assigned by the Council. In all other municipalities, the inherently beneficial use analysis should be applied to use variance applications to build affordable
housing.
234
This Comment should not be construed as arguing that there is no longer a
shortage of affordable housing in New Jersey or that affordable housing is not beneficial to all of New Jersey’s municipalities. Rather, the aim of this Comment is solely
to advocate that once a municipality has complied with its FHA requirements, an application for a use variance to build affordable housing should not receive preferential treatment because the need for such treatment no longer exists. The principle
reason for this argument is that a variance should not be used as a tool to subvert local zoning restrictions and should not be granted without consideration to the land
on which it will be put.
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ter to the notion that each variance case should be reviewed on its
235
own facts and that development should be primarily conducted
236
through zoning ordinances. The general rule is that the judgment
of a planning board should prevail because of the board’s unique
237
understanding of local conditions.
The Homes of Hope per se rule
that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use undermines
the zoning system, causes inefficiencies in land use, and violates the
concept that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that
of a board’s because of the board’s unique understanding of local
conditions.
Additionally, a per se rule that affordable housing is an inherently beneficial use conflicts with the assertion that deference should be
238
given to a zoning board’s decision to deny a variance and that all
239
variance applications are to be reviewed on their own facts. Reviewing a grant or denial of a variance on its own facts would seem to indicate situations could arise in which a use, deemed inherently beneficial in one municipality, would not be so in another. In fact,
William Cox stated that a doctor’s office, which might be inherently
beneficial in one portion of the country where doctor’s offices are
rare or nonexistent, is not considered inherently beneficial in New
235

See Burbridge v. Twp. of Mine Hill, 568 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1990).
See supra Part III.A.
237
See Burbidge, 568 A.2d at 532 (stating that “[b]oards of adjustment, because of
their peculiar knowledge of location conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in the
exercise of delegated discretion” (internal citations omitted)); Grubbs v. Slothower,
913 A.2d 137, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (stating “[b]ecause of its peculiar
knowledge of local conditions, the Board’s factual findings are entitled to substantial
deference and are presumed valid” (internal citations omitted)); Ne. Towers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W. Paterson, 744 A.2d 190, 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000).
It is not the role of the reviewing court to determine if the decision was
wise or unwise . . . . [B]ecause of [zoning boards’] peculiar knowledge
of local conditions [zoning boards] must be allowed wide latitude in
the exercise of delegated discretion. Courts cannot substitute an independent judgment for that of the boards in areas of factual disputes;
neither will they exercise anew the original jurisdiction of such boards
or trespass on their administrative work. So long as the power exists to
do the act complained of and there is substantial evidence to support
it, the judicial branch of the government cannot interfere.
Ne. Towers, 744 A.2d at 199. (internal citations omitted).
238
Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704 A.2d
1271, 1280 (N.J. 1997) (“Judicial review of the decision of a Planning Board or Board
of Adjustment ordinarily is limited. A board’s decision is presumptively valid, and is
reversible only if arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.” (internal citations omitted)).
239
See Burbridge, 568 A.2d at 532 (“In determining whether to uphold the grant of
a variance, the reviewing court must consider each case on its own facts.”).
236
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240

Jersey. Creating a per se rule that a use is inherently beneficial in
municipality Y because it was beneficial in municipality X undermines
the notion that use variance applications should be reviewed on a
241
case-by-case basis.
A per se rule ignores the reality that conditions and circumstances vary from municipality to municipality. For instance, in Eastampton, affordable housing is not needed whereas in other munici242
palities that have not fully complied with their affordable housing
requirement per the FHA, a need for affordable housing could be
demonstrated and therefore warrant the preferential treatment associated with the inherently beneficial use status. If the deference afforded to a zoning board is to have any meaning, then the standard
by which a use variance application to build affordable housing is reviewed should allow that board some latitude in determining what
the actual needs of that municipality are. Indeed, the concurring
opinion in Homes of Hope stated that “it is not illogical to conclude
that once a municipality has actually provided its fair share of affordable housing, further affordable housing projects need not retain
243
their status as inherently beneficial uses . . . .”
Because it is not illogical, zoning boards should be permitted the ability to make the
decision without fearing subsequent litigation. The decision in Homes
of Hope effectively abandons the deference supposedly afforded to
zoning boards by allowing the judiciary and developers to substitute
their judgment for that of the zoning board.
The Homes of Hope decision unnecessarily duplicates the efforts
of the Council in fully FHA-compliant municipalities, fails to account
for actual need or lack thereof for a proposed use within a municipality, and can lead to inefficient uses of land. In some variance cases,
courts utilize an individualized assessment of whether the municipality or region has a need for the proposed use, but such an assessment
is generally not undertaken when it comes to use variance applica244
tions to build affordable housing. An individualized assessment in
Homes of Hope would have reproduced an analysis similar to the one
240

COX, supra note 21, at 188–89.
See Burbridge, 568 A.2d at 532.
242
For a list of municipalities that have complied with the third round of COAH
obligations, see Council on Affordable Housing, N.J. DEPT. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, COUNCIL ON
AFFORDABLE HOUSING, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/index.html (click
“list of towns under COAH” to obtain an Excel spreadsheet listing compliant municipalities) (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
243
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128,
1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (Chambers, J., concurring).
244
See supra Part III.D. But see Part IV.A.
241
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245

performed by the Council.
If the analysis for an application for a
variance to build affordable housing were to follow a similar analysis
246
247
as that used in Sica or Kohl, an applicant would need to show some
evidence of a need for affordable housing in the municipality, which
is not possible without infringing on the Council’s responsibility.
Theoretically, a consideration of housing shortages would be needed
within that municipality and the surrounding areas, and then a determination would be made as to whether, given the shortage, a proposed project would qualify as an inherently beneficial use satisfying a
portion of that municipality’s need. The Council is already responsible for determining the state-wide need for affordable housing and
248
allocating a portion of that need to each municipality. Therefore,
any court’s assessment of need would duplicate the efforts of the
Council. A duplication of efforts would be advantageous in those
municipalities that refuse to comply with the FHA but is ultimately
unnecessary in fully compliant municipalities.
In fact, Homes of Hope, Inc. and the appellate division used the
COAH’s own estimation for the number of unmet housing units in
New Jersey in referencing a continued need for this preferential
249
standard for affordable housing. Because the Council already gave
250
substantive certification to Eastampton, it found that Eastampton
had already met its portion of that need. Additionally, in a fully
compliant FHA municipality, a request for a use variance to build affordable housing will resemble a builder’s remedy because the zoning board will be precluded from disallowing the variance unless it
finds the negative criteria cannot be met. Allowing affordable housing to remain as an inherently beneficial use in Eastampton (or any
other municipality that has fully complied with the FHA) duplicates
the process that the FHA performs. Arguably, this rule actually undermines the FHA process by negating the planning that municipalities have done to become compliant with the FHA and instead allows
for the grant of a variance without any consideration as to the suitability of the land for the purpose. The result is a process that gives no

245

See supra Part II.C.
603 A.2d 30 (1992); see supra Part III.D.
247
234 A.2d 385 (1967); see supra Part III.D.
248
See supra Part II.C.
249
Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Eastampton Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128,
1134 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009); Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc., supra note
82, at 17.
250
Brief of Eastampton, supra note 80, at DA33–34.
246
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flexibility to zoning boards, abandons the purpose of the planning
and variance system, and thereby leads to inefficient uses of land.
The Homes of Hope decision also undermines the preference for
development through zoning ordinances by disregarding the purpose
of a variance. The objective of a variance is to allow a particular use
that is not permitted on a particular parcel of land in a zone because
of the zoning ordinances but is nonetheless suitable for the land in
251
question.
Variances are not meant as a way to simply circumvent
252
zoning ordinances.
Because zoning through ordinances is pre253
ferred, variances are to be used sparingly. Where affordable housing is needed in a municipality, presumably as a result of a municipality’s failure to comply with the FHA, it should be deemed an
inherently beneficial use. If there is not a demonstrated need for affordable housing within the community, the applicant should have to
show site suitability. To hold otherwise clearly causes the exception
to swallow the rule by allowing a variance to be granted for less than
exceptional circumstances and without consideration of suitability.
While the grant of a variance is supposed to be used sparingly, Homes
of Hope serves to swallow that rule. The broad language used by the
court implies that, despite the fact that a variance application requires intensive inquiry, no factual scenario exists that would warrant
affordable housing not to be considered as an inherently beneficial
use. Such a decision threatens to make the grant of a use variance
more commonplace than is intended.
Homes of Hope, Inc. essentially argued in its brief that if affordable housing lost its inherently beneficial use status, it would be im254
possible to get a variance.
The perceived impossibility Homes of
Hope, Inc. claimed is not necessarily a bad thing. The difficultly associated with obtaining a use variance merely reflects a preference for
255
development through the use of zoning. The MLUL requires that a
zoning board review which of its zoning provisions were subject to
requests for variances and submit a report to the governing body
251
See Dover Twp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dover Twp., 386 A.2d 421, 426–27 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (“The variance power of the board of adjustment is . . .
intended to accommodate individual situations which, for a statutorily stated reason,
require relief from the restrictions and regulations otherwise uniformly applicable to
the district as a whole.”).
252
See id.
253
COX, supra note 23, at 182; see supra Part III.A.
254
Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc., supra note 82, at 11 (“[T]he road for noninherently beneficial uses is nearly impossible to travel and affords local municipalities almost absolute discretion.”).
255
See supra Part III.A.
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about potential amendments and revisions. Presumably, this review
and report requirement is meant to empower the governing body to
adjust current zoning ordinances based on the types of variances requested to make zoning more inclusive of those uses that required
257
variances to be built, and minimize future requests for variances.
Because a FHA-compliant municipality has already planned for, and
in Eastampton’s case already built, affordable housing, any recommendations by the zoning board should already be reflected in the
zoning.
B. Solutions Should Focus on Efficient Land Use
After the appellate division decided Homes of Hope, two New Jersey state senators, Philip Haines (R-Burlington) and Christopher
“Kip” Bateman (R-Somerset) announced intentions to introduce a
bill amending the MLUL to rectify the decision of the appellate divi258
sion in Homes of Hope. Haines said the decision “flies in the face of
common sense” and has caused us to “draft legislation to solve an is259
sue that shouldn’t have existed in the first place.”
Bateman explained that the citizens of New Jersey were assured during the debate over Mount Laurel that they would not be responsible for more
than their fair share of affordable housing and that this case under260
mined those assurances.
The proposed solution sought to add to
the MLUL one simple line, which stated that “[n]o municipality shall
be required by variance, or otherwise, to provide more than a fair
261
share of affordable housing.”
As of late 2010, the legislation ap262
pears to have been abandoned for a more drastic approach. Given

256

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70.1 (West 2009).
See, e.g., Medici v. BPR Co., 526 A.2d 109, 119 (N.J. 1987) (“Similarly, the annual reports by boards of adjustment summarizing variance requests throughout the
year and recommending amendments to the zoning ordinance are designed to avoid
successive appeals for the same types of variance by encouraging the governing body
to amend the ordinance so that such appeals will be unnecessary.”).
258
Tom Hester, Sr., Bill Stemming from Affordable Housing Court Ruling to Be Introduced, N.J. NEWSROOM (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com
/state/bill-stemming-from-affordable-housing-court-ruling-to-be-introduced.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
See Bill to Solve Ill-Advised Mount Laurel Court Case to Be Introduced, SENATOR PHIL
HAINES, N.J.’S 8TH LEGISLATIVE DIST. (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.senatenj.com
/index.php/haines/bill-to-solve-ill-advised-mount-laurel-court-case-to-beintroduced/4202.
262
See infra note 263 (briefly discussing additional legislation before the Senate
that has been referred to the Senate Economic Growth Committee which takes an
entirely different approach).
257
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the fluidity of the debate, however, it is helpful to examine such an
approach as another possible solution to the legal issue raised by
Homes of Hope.
First, the potential solution is likely to be politically unpopular.
The fact that this proposed solution is a general ban on accepting
more than a municipality’s fair share raises doubts as to whether the
drafters hold the same concern elucidated by this Comment—the efficient use of land and the sparing use of variances. Second, the senators’ solution is too broad. No valid reason explains why an applicant for a variance to build affordable housing could not go through
the non-inherently beneficial use route. This is the same path all
other applicants for variances must take, and concluding that because
a municipality has complied with the FHA it should never have to
even consider accepting more affordable housing through a use variance is unnecessary and unreasonable. Where a parcel of land can
be used for a purpose not permitted by the zoning, it should receive a
variance if the legal requirements for obtaining a variance are met.
A more sensible compromise is possible. Where a municipality
has complied with its FHA requirement, affordable housing should
be deemed a non-inherently beneficial use in that municipality. The
judiciary, rather than the legislature, is the appropriate branch to
handle such a declaration because the judiciary created the doctrine
of inherently beneficial use in the first place. The judiciary is more
capable of making a narrow, case-by-case decision that thereby reflects the individuality of the variance process. The judiciary’s failure
to refine the doctrine could lead to the adoption of the proposed legislation, which is unnecessary and creates bad policy. Removing affordable housing from inherently beneficial use status in a FHAcompliant municipality makes sense because a need for affordable
housing within that municipality is no longer demonstrated. Further,
allowing affordable housing to remain as an inherently beneficial use
in municipalities that have not complied with their FHA requirement
provides another tool to incentivize compliance with the FHA.
Such a decision would harmonize the MLUL and the FHA. The
FHA would remain the primary legislation equipped to handle the
263
affordable housing shortage in New Jersey.
Variance practices re263
At the time of the writing of this Comment, State Senator Raymond Lesniak
introduced legislation that would abolish the Council on Affordable Housing and
vest the powers and duties that are not repealed by the legislation with the Department of Community Affairs. S. 1, 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/1_R1a.PDF; Peggy Ackermann and
Claire Heininger, New Jersey Senate Passes Affordable Housing Overhaul, NJ.COM (Jun. 11,
2010),
http://www.nj.com/sunbeam/index.ssf?/base/news-6/1276238420285890
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.xml&coll=9. Questions about the bill’s ultimate constitutionality exist. See Elizabeth
Downey, Opinion Letter, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., N.J. STATE LEGISLATURE (Apr.
13, 2010), available at FairShareHousing.Org (search “Office of Legislative Services”;
then follow “OSL; Lesniak Housing Bill Dead On Arrival” hyperlink at top of the
page; then click on “Read OLS analysis here” hyperlink at bottom of the page) (last
visited Dec. 30, 2010). The Office of Legislative Services concluded that while the
Legislature has the authority to abolish the Council on Affordable Housing, provisions allowing for the satisfaction of affordable housing needs through inclusionary
zoning techniques alone “may be susceptible to a constitutional challenge on the basis that relying solely on inclusionary zoning ordinances may violate the constitutional requirement that the exercise of a municipality’s land use regulations promotes
the general welfare.” Id. at 1. Affordable-housing advocates argue implementing S1would only worsen New Jersey’s affordable housing problem. See Kevin D. Walsh,
Affordable Housing: Bill Eliminating COAH Would Only Make Matters Worse,
DAILYRECORD.COM
(Jul.
25,
2010),
available
at
http://fairsharehousing.org/pdf/072510_-_Affordable_Housing_Bill_eliminating_
COAH_would_only_make_matters_worse.pdf; see also Kevin D. Walsh, New Jersey Law
Journal Editorial on S-1, FAIR SHARE HOUSING CENTER BLOG (Jun. 18, 2010),
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/new-jersey-law-journal-editorial-on-s-1/ (criticizing S-1 for doing away with state-imposed calculations of affordable housing
needs in favor of allowing municipalities to certify their own compliance after meeting certain minimal requirements).
The Assembly on December 13, 2010, passed its version of S1, known as A3447.
Assemb. 3447, 214th Leg. Reg. Sess. (NJ 2010). Because the focus of this Comment
is the role a use variance plays in land use and development, it will not provide any
commentary on the ultimate effectiveness of either S1 or A3447 in creating affordable housing. Most germane to this Comment is that both versions of the bill serve to
further the argument advanced herein. The bill explicitly states that a variance for
affordable housing in a municipality deemed “inclusionary” should not be reviewed
under the inherently beneficial use standard. Id. at 6. The provision of the bill allowing a zoning board of adjustment, or other land use board, to review a use variance to build affordable housing as a non-inherently beneficial use will give effect
to the admonition that variances should be used sparingly. See supra Part III.A. Such
a provision will eliminate another factual scenario akin to that confronted in Eastampton from occurring.
At this point it remains uncertain whether Governor Christie will sign the bill into law. Governor Christie supported S1. See Tom Hester Sr., Christie Wants N.J Affordable Housing Bill Approved by the End of June, NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM (Jun. 17, 2010),
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/christie-wants-nj-affordable-housing-billapproved-by-end-of-june. NJ.com, however, has reported that Governor Christie is
not likely to sign the Assembly’s version of the bill because it does not go far enough
to alleviate the perceived burdens on municipalities in complying with their affordable-housing requirements. See Matt Friedman, N.J. Assembly Approves Bill Abolishing
Council on Affordable Housing, NJ.COM (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news
/index.ssf/2010/12/nj_assembly_approves_bill_abol.html (citing a spokesman for
Gov. Christie explaining Christie’s opposition to the version of the bill passed by the
Assembly); see also David Levinsky, Christie Likely to Veto Housing Bill, PHILLYBURBS.COM
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.phillyburbs.com/news/news_details/article/26/2010
/december/14/christie-likely-to-veto-housing-bill.html. The article quotes Assemblyman Jon Brammick, a Republican representing Union, as stating “Quotas cannot
be in this legislation. I am convinced that the governor will not sign quotas, and I’m
convinced it’s not in the best interest of the state.” See Friedman, supra.
Adam Gordon, of the Fair Share Housing Center, argues, however, that the Assembly bill makes “municipal obligations much lower than any prior numbers issued
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garding affordable housing would return to their intended purpose
and provide specific relief from zoning ordinances to use a piece of
land because it is well-suited for that use. Variance practice would also cease to be more protective of affordable housing than the legisla264
tion designed to handle the statewide shortfall.
Homes of Hope,
Inc. argued that removing inherently beneficial use status from affordable housing would essentially create a slippery slope by allowing
a municipality to refuse variance applications for schools, churches,
265
and hospitals. But if a municipality does not need another school,
should a variance application be granted merely because another
municipality determined a school would be inherently beneficial in
its borders?
Too much of a good thing can be unnecessary and lead to inefficient uses of land. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, when explaining why cell phone towers were not inherently beneficial, noted
that “inherently beneficial uses are generally limited in number with266
in a single municipality.” This led William Cox, an expert in New
Jersey land use, to conclude that “where the need that the proposed
use meets is already satisfied, it may no longer be necessary to consid267
er the use inherently beneficial.” While the construction of affordby COAH.” Adam Gordon, Need for Housing Greater than Ever, but Under Assembly Bill,
Municipal Obligations Go Down, FAIRSHAREHOUSINGCENTER BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://fairsharehousing.org/blog/entry/need-for-housing-greater-than-ever-butunder-assembly-housing-bill-municipa/. The Fair Share Housing Center says the Assembly’s estimates of the amount of housing created under the new bill are overstated. Id. It finds that creation is likely to be between 30,000-to-35,000 units over
the next decade, which it compares to the 52,747 units required under the rules
struck down by the appellate division in 2007. Id. According to the Fair Share Housing Center, the number of affordable housing units generated under the Assembly’s
bill is too low. Kevin Walsh, Assembly Housing Bill an Improvement, but Obligations too
Low, FAIRSHAREHOUSINGCENTER BLOG (Dec. 10, 2010) http://fairsharehousing.org
/blog/entry/assembly-housing-bill-an-improvement-but-obligations-too-low/.
With the future and the effectiveness of the Assembly bill unclear, this Comment
continues to urge that any solution to the housing conundrum in N.J, should not be
solved by over-extending the role of a use variance in planning and developing. To
the extent that this Comment’s arguments were premised on the notion of COAH
certification, this Comment and its discussion of Eastampton can be read as a cautionary tale for future regulatory schemes that attempt to remedy the affordable housing dilemma in New Jersey. The tale is simple and steeped in the theory underpinning a use variance: that it should be used sparingly. See supra Part III.A. It should
not be used as a substitute for a state-wide solution to the affordability of housing in
N.J.
264
See supra Part II.C.
265
See Brief of Homes of Hope, Inc., supra note 82, at 18.
266
Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 704
A.2d 1271, 1281 (N.J. 1998).
267
COX, supra note 23, at 188.
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able housing has laudable origins, building anything simply because a
builder can do so is a wholly inefficient use of resources and subverts
cohesive planning.
Eastampton and other FHA-compliant municipalities have appropriately planned for and included within their boundaries the regional need for affordable housing; therefore, no need can currently
be demonstrated within those municipalities for affordable housing
(unless one is prepared to say the entire COAH process is wholly deficient and a need exists as a result of the Council’s deficiency, as undoubtedly some might argue). As a result, affordable housing should
be deemed a non-inherently beneficial use in those municipalities.
Returning affordable housing to non-inherently beneficial use status
in FHA-compliant municipalities will lead to better planning, will not
duplicate the efforts of the Council, and will harmonize the notion of
why a variance is used and the deferential standard applied in variance cases by the judiciary.
In summary, in municipalities that are fully compliant with the
FHA, affordable housing should not be an inherently beneficial use
for the purposes of obtaining a use variance. To obtain a use variance for affordable housing in a FHA-compliant municipality, an
applicant should have to show site suitability when satisfying the positive criteria and be subject to the enhanced quality of proof for the
negative criteria. State policy favors development through zoning as
268
opposed to spot development. If a municipality has complied with
FHA, it has appropriately and satisfactorily planned for affordable
housing in its zoning ordinances and has fulfilled its portion of the
region’s affordable housing need. Therefore, no need exists within
the municipality that can be used to claim that the inherently beneficial use status will help satisfy an affordable housing shortage. Given
the legislative preference for development through zoning, use va269
riances should be used sparingly.
The reasons to grant a use variance should be substantial and should be grounded in the theory
that the parcel of land is suitable for the proposed use. Further, using the non-inherently beneficial use status for an application for a
use variance to build affordable housing will preserve the traditional
deference to planning boards in evaluating variance applications
270
based on their unique understanding of the local circumstances. In
contrast, a rule establishing affordable housing as a universal inherently beneficial use undermines that deference. Therefore, afforda268
269
270

See supra Part III.A.
Id.
Id.
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ble housing should be treated as a non-inherently beneficial use in
municipalities that have fully satisfied their FHA requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to end exclusionary zoning practices in New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared every municipality has a
constitutional obligation to provide affordable housing within its
271
boundaries. The New Jersey State Legislature responded by passing
272
the FHA, which created the Council on Affordable Housing.
The
Council is tasked with determining a municipality’s fair share of the
273
state-wide need for affordable housing. Five years prior to deciding
Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that affordable housing constituted a special reason for the grant of a use va274
riance under the MLUL. Since then, affordable housing has been
deemed an inherently beneficial use by zoning boards and courts
275
across the State. The designation as an inherently beneficial use allows an applicant for a use variance to satisfy the positive criteria for a
use variance without requiring the applicant to show the land on
276
which the use will be placed is particularly well suited for that use.
In August of 2009, the appellate division decided Homes of Hope,
which found that despite a municipality’s full compliance with the
FHA and satisfaction of its affordable housing obligation, an application for a use variance to build affordable housing must still be ana277
lyzed under the inherently beneficial use analysis. This decision in278
There are,
spired a large amount of exaggerated criticism.
however, principled policy reasons for opposing the decision in
Homes of Hope.
Chief among these reasons is the imperative to show a need for
279
In Homes of Hope, the appellate divian inherently beneficial use.
sion and Homes of Hope, Inc. referenced the need projected by the

271

See supra Part II.A–B.
See supra Part II.C.
273
Id.
274
See DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Hous. Corp. No. 1, 267 A.2d 31, 38–39
(N.J. 1970).
275
See supra Part IV.A.
276
See supra Part III.B.
277
See supra Part IV.B.
278
See supra Part IV.C.
279
See COX, supra note 23, at 185–88 (discussing inherently beneficial uses and
summarizing various cases dealing with inherently beneficial uses).
272
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Council. Referencing this need, however, ignored the fact that Eastampton had already satisfied its portion of that need and duplicated
the efforts of the Council. It therefore left Eastampton without a
need to justify the preferential treatment in the use variance application.
Further, a zoning board is recognized as being particularly wellsuited to make decisions regarding the needs of its community, and
hence, the judiciary generally treats a denial of a variance with great
281
deference. To give life to this admonition, a zoning board in a fully
compliant FHA municipality should be entitled to review an application for a use variance under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis rather than under the inherently beneficial use analysis. Allowing
zoning boards to review a use variance application to build affordable
housing in a fully FHA-compliant municipality under the noninherently beneficial use analysis will lead to more efficient land use
decisions. Under the non-inherently beneficial use analysis, the applicant will have to show the land in question is particularly well282
suited to the proposed use.
This will also restore a variance, in
these compliant municipalities, to its intended purpose, which is specific relief from zoning restrictions in exceptional circumstances. A
per se rule that affordable housing constitutes an inherently beneficial use in every municipality, merely because it has in the past, violates the fact-intensive inquiry a use variance requires and ignores
the realities of differing conditions in municipalities across the State;
therefore, affordable housing, in a fully FHA-compliant municipality,
should be considered a non-inherently beneficial use in terms of a
use variance application.

280
Homes of Hope, Inc., v. Eastampton Land Use Planning Bd., 976 A.2d 1128,
1134 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
281
See supra Part III.A.
282
See supra Part III.B.

